9 Comments

One of the problems with posts like this is the attempt to stitch together a grand narrative when bilateral or trilateral events may be best be viewed in that prism: bilateral or trilateral.

Turkey is implementing -- very correctly -- an independent foreign policy that maximises its own rational self-benefits. There is absolutely nothing wrong with this in itself. However, it also does not mean that every one of its initiatives named will materialise, or that the country itself does not have tremendous internal weaknesses.

Regarding oil and gas resources in the north-eastern Mediterranean: most of these are under deep water and the challenges to developing them are not so much geopolitical as technical and economic. This has been apparent as far back as 2010. The real game in the eastern Med now is the (relatively) shallow-water Zohr deposit off Egypt, and the strategic role this will have.

Extraction in Greece and Cyprus has had over 15 years to mature, but is still not ongoing. The problem appears more to be in terms of a national policy in light of volatile prices rather than Turkey.

I would take any announcements of Saudi development with a big pinch of salt. There is little economic rational for developments like The Line, and other mega project announcements have almost never materialised.

If there is a grand narrative to be seen here, I would suspect that it is about the limits of authoritarian leaders. I believe that if anything, we are at the end of this cycle, including in apparent superpowers like China. The problems that have built up under the surface of China, Russia, and Turkey are now all too apparent. I see few signs at the systemic level that these countries are prepared for a very difficult future, where the systemic socio-economic and business model may rapidly change.

By the way, the same thing is apparent in the United States. We are clearly at a late stage of the Republic, with Americans of every ideology increasingly putting their faith in a "man on a horse". In this respect, the US is out of synch with Russia, Turkey and China, which made that transition decades ago. A defining feature of the next 10 years will be the extent to which the United States can continue projecting power and maintaining the post Cold War order it has built up in Europe and the Middle East, or the extent to which it must retreat. Judging by the absolute mess in the Middle East, I'm better on the latter.

Expand full comment

Can a country with a very fragile financial system play the Great Power role? Usually, a strong (or at least not weak) economy is necessary for that kind of adventure. Perhaps my understanding is not correct, but if it is correct about Erdogan's meddling in the economy and attempt to defy market logic, Turkey may not have the economic stamina needed to play in the game.

Expand full comment

Good overview. They know their history in Turkey. Have you heard of Boris Johnson's links to the Ottomans?

I worked in Cyprus and Israel exploring the oil there. Very deep water >2000m. Expensive to extract. I remember lots of Russian mafia and Russian owned 'pawn your gold' shops in Cyprus, which was suffering after the 'haircut'

Expand full comment

You were proven wrong almost instantly which confirms what Phillip Ammerman wrote and what was also my feeling sometimes reading your articles. Or he got explicit support from Xi or he will prove everyone that he (meaning the state/country doesn't care whatever the pressures are

Expand full comment

Very enlightening article. As alluded to by some, the only issue I see with Turkey is its crumbling finances and how that might play out. Interestingly Peter Zeihan also sees Turkey as a rapidly rising regional power player in the next few years.

Expand full comment

Excellent article, once again. Thanks!

I would like to add another point (and a question) to the big picture: Turkey holds the keys to NATO's expansion to Finland and Sweden. Will they allow that or not?

Expand full comment